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ver the past 20 years, the U.S. economy has 
had fewer and shorter recessions. In ad-
dition, over time, swings in the growth of 
many macroeconomic variables, such as gross 
domestic product, have become smaller. Why this decline 
in economic volatility? In this article, Keith Sill high-
lights some of the facts about the increased stability of 
the U.S. economy and assesses the contribution of policy 
and other factors to the decline in volatility.
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The U.S. economy appears 
to have become much more stable in 
the 1990s and early 2000s than it was 
in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.  We 
have fewer and shorter recessions, and 
the swings, over time, in the growth 
of real gross domestic product (GDP), 
unemployment, inflation, and a host of 
other macroeconomic variables have 
become smaller.  Many explanations 
have been offered for this lower volatil-
ity in economic activity.  Some are 
related to changes in the structure of 
the economy, such as better inventory 
management and the shift in employ-
ment from manufacturing industries to 
service industries. Some focus on the 
contribution of changes in monetary 
and fiscal policy to the increase in 
economic stability.
This increase in economic 
stability is beneficial if it means that 
households face lower risk.  Generally, 
people are risk-averse — they prefer a 
sure thing to an uncertain outcome. 
A more stable economy with fewer 
recessions means that employment 
and incomes are likely more stable.  
Fewer households may face the severe 
consequences of long-term job loss.  
Households, especially those that have 
difficulty borrowing, have less variable 
consumption and face less uncertainty 
when making their spending plans.
In this article I will highlight 
some of the facts about the increased 
stability of the U.S. economy and 
assess the contribution of policy and 
nonpolicy factors in accounting for the 
decline in economic volatility.  We will 
see that a change in monetary policy 
since the early 1980s seems to be an 
important part of the story behind 
the increased stability of the U.S. 
economy.
DOCUMENTING THE DECLINE
The U.S. economy has 
become much more stable since the 
1980s.  Examining the growth rate of 
real GDP in the U.S., we can eas-
ily see this increased stability (Fig-
ure 1).  From the mid-1950s to the 
1980s, quarterly growth of real GDP 
mostly moved in a range from about 
-1 to +1.25 percent.  In the 1990s 
and 2000s, real GDP growth did not 
exceed 0.75 percent or fall below 0.5 
percent. It is clear that swings in real 
GDP growth have become much 
smaller over the last 20 years or so.  
The volatility of real GDP 
growth can be measured using the 
standard deviation, which quantifies 
how much a variable moves up and 
down around its average value.  By this 
measure, the volatility of real GDP 
growth is much lower in the 1990s and 
2000s than before. The table shows 
volatility measures for several variables 
by decades.  In the 1960s, volatility 
was somewhat lower than the postwar 
average, before jumping up in the 
1970s.  Volatility was about as high in 
the 1980s as it was in the 1970s, then 
fell dramatically during the 1990s.  
The table also shows the 
coefficient of variation for each vari-
able by decade. The coefficient of 
variation adjusts the standard devia-
tion for changes in the mean level of 
the variable. We see the same general 
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volatility was lower in the 1990s. 
Figure 2 shows how the vola-
tility of real GDP growth has evolved 
over time.1 From the mid-1950s to the 
FIGURE 1
Quarterly Real GDP Growth
mid-1960s, volatility largely fell from 
a high of about 0.7 percent to a low of 
about 0.3 percent. From the mid-1960s 
to the mid-1980s, volatility generally 
increased, reaching almost 0.6 percent 
in 1982. But from the mid-1980s on, 
volatility has dropped dramatically, 
falling to below 0.27 percent by the 
early 2000s. On balance, it appears 
that the volatility of real GDP growth 
since the mid-1980s is, on average, 
about half of what it was prior to that 
time. 
The increased stability of 
the U.S. economy is apparent in many 
macroeconomic series, not just real 
GDP growth. A recent paper by James 
Stock and Mark Watson examined the 
volatility of 168 macroeconomic vari-
ables, including output, employment, 
consumption, and investment.  They 
find that volatility has declined broad-
ly across many measures of economic 
activity. Typically, standard deviations 
are 30 percent to 40 percent lower now 
compared with what they were in the 
1970s and early 1980s.  In addition 
to the volatility of real variables, the 
volatility of inflation has also fallen.  
For example, the volatility of inflation, 
as measured by the standard deviation 
of the GDP deflator, averaged 0.39 
percent in the 1960s, then rose to 0.53 
percent in the 1970s and 0.60 percent 
in the 1980s, before falling to 0.24 
percent in the 1990s.  
State-level data for the U.S. 
show a similar decline in volatility 
over the postwar period.  My recent 
work with Gerald Carlino and Robert 
DeFina investigated the volatility of 
employment across U.S. states and 
industries.  We found that employment 
volatility has declined for virtually 
all states and across major industries 
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Real GDP Growth
Std % 0.63 0.38 0.48 0.42 0.25
cv 1.47 0.83 1.35 1.31 0.74
Unemployment
Std % 1.28 1.08 1.16 1.48 1.05
cv 0.28 0.23 0.19 0.20 0.18
GDP Deflator Inflation
Std % 0.74 0.39 0.53 0.60 0.24
cv 1.18 0.63 0.32 0.53 0.43
cv is the coefficient of variation, defined as the standard deviation divided by mean.
TABLE
Volatility by Decade
1 The volatility of real GDP growth is measured 
using a 20-quarter rolling standard deviation.  
That is, each point on the graph represents 
a standard deviation calculated using the 
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FIGURE 2
Standard Deviation of Real GDP Growth
(percentage points)
within states. Greater stability has oc-
curred across all regions of the coun-
try and across different industries and 
sectors of the economy.  In short, the 
decline in volatility is a widespread 
phenomenon for the U.S. economy.
Figure 2 suggests that volatil-
ity dropped abruptly in the 1980s, and 
much of the analysis on the increased 
stability of the U.S. economy sug-
gests that the drop in volatility can 
be characterized as a sharp break that 
occurred in the 1980s. In fact, various 
statistical methods suggest that the 
drop in volatility occurred sometime 
around the first quarter of 1984.2 
But one might argue instead that the 
decline in volatility is a long-term 
phenomenon. Perhaps volatility was 
declining in the 1950s and 1960s, was 
interrupted in the 1970s, then resumed 
in the 1980s. Olivier Blanchard and 
John Simon (2001) suggest that the 
drop in the volatility of real GDP 
growth over the postwar period is best 
described by such a long-term trend 
phenomenon. Whether the decline 
in the volatility of real GDP growth 
is best described as a long-term trend 
or a sharp one-time break remains an 
open question. 
Since the swings in real out-
put growth have become smaller over 
time, the declines in real GDP growth 
during recessions are not as large (see 
Figure 1). Chang-Jin Kim and Charles 
Nelson calculated the average growth 
rate of real output in recessions and 
in expansions. They found that the 
difference in average growth rates 
between recessions and expansions has 
declined over time.  Thus, recessions 
are not as severe and booms are not as 
pronounced today as they have been in 
the past.  
Blanchard and Simon’s cal-
culations demonstrate that recessions 
have become shorter. They estimated 
models for the pre-1981 and post-1981 
U.S. economy, then simulated these 
models to generate many alternative 
histories for the U.S. economy in the 
pre-1981 and post-1981 eras. Their 
estimated models imply that, on aver-
age, expansions would have lasted 17 
quarters in the pre-1981 period and 
51 quarters in the post-1981 period. In 
the data, the average length of expan-
sions was 19 quarters before 1981 and 
36 quarters after 1981. Their analysis 
suggests that it is more than just an 
absence of large shocks hitting the 
economy, such as sharp increases in oil 
prices, that is responsible for the lower 
volatility experienced since the mid-
1980s. Something is structurally differ-
ent about the economy or monetary or 
fiscal policy. 
WHY HAS ECONOMIC 
VOLATILITY DECLINED?
There are many theories 
about why the economy has become 
more stable.  Economists have been at-
tempting to quantify the contribution 
of these potential causes to the decline 
in volatility.  Research to date indi-
cates that improved monetary policy 
accounts for perhaps 20 percent of the 
decline in real output growth volatility 
since the mid-1980s.  The remainder of 
the drop in volatility can be attributed 
to various non-policy factors and to 
plain good luck in the form of smaller 
shocks. Fiscal policy has not been 
found to be a factor in the decrease in 
volatility. 
Inventories. A prominent 
hypothesis about the drop in volatility 
of real output growth is that improve-
ments in information technology have 
2 Research that puts the break in volatility as 
occurring right around 1984 includes that of 
Chang-Jin Kim and Charles Nelson, Margaret 
McConnell and Gabriel Perez-Quiros, and 
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allowed firms to better manage their 
inventories, thereby making produc-
tion and output less volatile. Inventory 
behavior is a natural avenue to explore 
when looking for root causes of the 
increased stability of the economy 
because inventories appear to play a 
large role in the business cycle.  For 
example, almost half of the fall in 
U.S. production during recessions can 
be explained by a reduction in net 
inventory investment, even though net 
inventory investment is, on average, 
only about 0.5 percent of GDP.3 
Evidence presented in
recent work by James Kahn, Margaret
McConnell, and Gabriel Perez-Quiros 
suggests that most of the reduction 
in the volatility of real GDP can be 
explained by a reduction in the volatil-
ity of output in the durable goods 
sector. Further, the volatility of durable 
goods output — that is, production 
— dropped much more than did 
the volatility of durable goods sales. 
Changes in inventory management 
must account for this difference, since 
production equals sales plus invento-
ries.  Changes in demand now appear 
to lead to smaller swings in production 
than they did 30 years ago, which im-
plies that swings in inventory invest-
ment now contribute less to swings 
in production. Kahn, McConnell, 
and Perez-Quiros argue that inven-
tory investment is now better able to 
anticipate sales and thus has led to less 
volatile production. 
Other researchers are un-
convinced by the theory that inven-
tory management has improved to 
the extent that the economy is now 
more stable.  They find statistically 
significant drops in the volatility of 
total sales and the volatility of sales 
of durable goods.  In addition, the 
finding that the variance of produc-
tion has fallen more than the variance 
of sales is sensitive to how longer run 
trends are removed from the data.  On 
balance, the contribution of inven-
tory management to the decline in 
volatility of real output growth remains 
unsettled. For example, recent work by 
Aubhik Khan and Julia Thomas shows 
how just-in-time-inventory methods 
can actually increase the volatility of 
real output.  Firms that hold low levels 
of inventories have to adjust produc-
tion more frequently, which, in their 
model, tends to increase the volatility 
of real GDP.
Employment Shift from 
Manufacturing to Services.  The 
changing structure of the U.S. econo-
my away from manufacturing and to-
ward services is often cited as another 
potential explanation for the increased 
stability of the economy.  Histori-
cally, the manufacturing sector of the 
economy has been more volatile than 
the services sector.  However, manu-
facturing’s share of total employment 
has declined relative to services’ share 
of total employment.4 For example, 
manufacturing’s share of total employ-
ment was 26 percent in 1950 but had 
fallen to 17 percent by 1990. Services’ 
share of employment rose from 12 per-
cent in 1950 to 24 percent in 1990. In 
the early 1950s, the volatility of manu-
facturing employment was about 1.7 
times that of services employment. By 
the mid-1990s, this volatility gap had 
fallen, though manufacturing employ-
ment was still 1.25 times as volatile as 
services employment.
We might expect that the 
overall economy would become less 
volatile as employment shifted from 
manufacturing to services. Carlino, 
DeFina, and I found that the shift in 
employment toward services played 
a role in the decline in employment 
volatility, though the role appears to 
be small. Adherents of the view that 
volatility dropped sharply in 1984 are 
unlikely to accept the manufactur-
ing-to-services-shift theory because it 
doesn’t get the timing right. We saw 
that the volatility of real output growth 
dropped sharply in the early 1980s. But 
the shift in employment from manufac-
turing to services has been a gradual 
process over the last 50 years. So the 
industry-shift theory would more likely 
support the notion of a gradual decline 
in output volatility rather than a sharp 
drop. 
Oil Prices.  Another po-
tential factor contributing to the 
increased stability of the U.S. economy 
is the behavior of oil prices.  Sharp 
increases in oil prices have been shown 
to be associated with most postwar 
recessions.5  Prior to the mid-1980s, 
there were major oil supply disrup-
tions associated with the Suez crisis 
in 1956, the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, 
the Iranian revolution in 1978, and 
the Iran-Iraq war in 1980.  Since the 
3 See the Business Review article by Aubhik 
Khan for a discussion of the role of inventory 
investment in business cycles. 
The contribution of inventory management to 
the decline in volatility of real output growth 
remains unsettled. 
4 However, manufacturing’s share of total 
output has stayed at about the same level over 
the postwar period.  Although manufacturing’s 
share of employment has decreased over time, 
manufacturing workers have become relatively 
more productive.
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Iran-Iraq war, the only significant 
supply disruption occurred in 1990 
just prior to the Persian Gulf war. 
However, it is also the case that oil 
prices have been much more variable 
since 1980 than before, which makes 
it difficult to analyze the effect of oil 
prices on the post-1980 economy. This 
is because, in the post-1980 period, 
demand conditions have much more of 
an immediate effect on oil prices than 
they did pre-1980.  As a consequence, 
it is more difficult to identify the types 
of oil-price shocks that can lead to 
downturns in economic activity.  
James Stock and Mark Watson, 
using a statistical model, found that oil-
price shocks are not a major contributor 
to the decline in output growth volatility. 
In fact, because the price of oil has been 
more variable in the post-1980 period, 
they found that oil prices tend to push 
up economic volatility after the mid-
1980s.  Sylvain Leduc and I used a model 
of the U.S. economy with an oil sector 
to examine the decline in economic 
volatility since the mid-1980s. We also 
found that oil-price shocks played almost 
no role in the increased stability of the 
economy.  
Productivity Shocks. Econ-
omists have identified productivity 
growth as a factor that plays an impor-
tant role in the lower volatility of real 
GDP growth. The relevant measure 
is total factor productivity (TFP), a 
broad measure of technical change. 
TFP growth, growth in capital stock 
(plant and equipment), and growth in 
total hours worked in production are 
combined to determine output growth. 
So TFP is the part of output growth 
unexplained by growth in capital stock 
and hours worked. If the volatility of 
both capital growth and hours worked 
is unchanged, lower volatility of TFP 
growth translates into lower volatility 
of real output growth. Indeed, a plot 
of the volatility of TFP growth shows 
a pattern that broadly mimics that of 
stability of the U.S. economy.  It turns 
out, though, that any role for policy in 
the recent stabilization of the economy 
most likely came through monetary 
policy, since most observers find little 
role for fiscal policy.
Fiscal Policy. The primary 
ways in which fiscal policy could play 
a role in stabilizing the economy are 
through taxing and spending. Income 
taxes can work like an automatic 
stabilizer. When incomes are high, 
taxes are high, and after-tax incomes 
are relatively low. When income is low, 
taxes are low, and after-tax income 
is relatively high. Thus, income taxes 
have a stabilizing effect on after-tax in-
comes and so may be an influence that 
stabilizes spending. However, fiscal 
stabilizers such as taxes were at about 
the same level in 1995 as they were in 
the 1960s. So, tax policy is unlikely to 
be much of a factor in the economic 
stabilization that occurred from the 
1960s through the 1990s. 
Fiscal policy may also help 
stabilize the economy through counter-
cyclical spending policies — increasing 
government spending when economic 
growth is weak and cutting back on 
government spending when economic 
growth is strong. However, counter-
cyclical fiscal policy does not seem 
any more a factor in the economy’s 
performance after the mid-1980s than 
before. For example, the discretion-
ary stimulus packages submitted by 
Presidents Bush and Clinton in 1992 
and 1993 were defeated by Congress.  
In addition, discretionary stimulus 
packages are not a usual feature of 
the federal budget in nonrecession-
ary times. On balance, there is little 
prima facie evidence that fiscal policy 
has played a significant role in the 
increased stability of the U.S. economy 
since the mid-1980s.
Monetary Policy. Monetary 
policy underwent a significant change 
in the early 1980s as part of an effort 
real output growth volatility (Figure 3). 
Volatility of TFP growth was high in 
the 1970s, then fell dramatically after 
the early 1980s.  
How much does the volatil-
ity of TFP growth contribute to the 
decline in real output growth volatil-
ity?  Estimates vary. Leduc and I found 
that lower TFP volatility accounted 
for about 80 percent of the drop in real 
output volatility in our model of the 
U.S. economy.  Using state-level em-
ployment data, Carlino, DeFina, and I 
set TFP’s contribution to the decline 
in employment volatility at a mini-
mum of 4 percent to a maximum of 36 
percent. Stock and Watson attributed 
about 15 percent of the decline in real 
GDP volatility to the decline in volatil-
ity of labor productivity in their model.  
These results suggest that the volatility 
of productivity is an important part of 
the story of the decline in real output 
volatility. But it is not the whole story.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF 
FISCAL AND MONETARY 
POLICY TO INCREASED 
STABILITY
The nonpolicy factors dis-
cussed above are unable to account for 
the entire drop in the volatility of real 
output growth since 1984. It is possible 
that better monetary and fiscal policy 
since the mid-1980s has played a mea-
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to bring high and rising inflation un-
der control. Could this anti-inflation 
monetary policy also lead to a more 
stable overall economy? In the 1980s 
and 1990s, it appears that the Fed 
responded more aggressively to move-
ments in inflation. By not letting infla-
tion get too high, the Fed may have 
mitigated, or eliminated, boom-bust 
cycles that led to wide swings in real 
GDP growth in the pre-1980s period 
and hence a more unstable economy. 
The more aggressive mon-
etary policy response to inflation can 
be seen in Figure 4, which plots the 
CPI inflation rate and the federal 
funds rate, the interest rate the Fed 
controls in setting its policy. Note, 
for example, that the federal funds 
rate was 4.8 percent in 1968 when 
the inflation rate had accelerated to 
4 percent.  Compare this with 1989, 
when inflation had again accelerated 
to 4 percent, but the federal funds 
rate was 9.7 percent. Thus, the same 
level of inflation was associated with 
a fed funds rate that was twice as 
high, suggesting that monetary policy 
was conducted differently after 1980. 
Monetary policymakers were willing to 
raise interest rates more aggressively to 
combat rising inflation to try to rein it 
in before it got too high.  The Fed was 
trying to avoid the simultaneous high 
inflation and low real output growth 
that occurred in the 1970s. 
More thorough analysis of the 
data suggests that indeed monetary 
policy shifted toward more aggres-
sive inflation fighting around 1979, 
roughly coinciding with the start of 
Paul Volcker’s tenure as Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve. A recent paper by 
Richard Clarida, Jordi Gali, and Mark 
Gertler found that the Fed did not 
raise interest rates enough in response 
to rising inflation in the pre-1979 era 
to keep from feeding inflationary pres-
sures. Post-1979, they found that the 
Fed moved interest rates much more 
strongly in response to changes in in-
flation. Sylvain Leduc, Tom Stark, and 
I also found that easy monetary policy 
before 1979 contributed to persistently 
high inflation. Our analysis showed 
that, after 1979, the Fed was much 
more effective in using monetary policy 
to keep inflation under control.6 
However, a recent paper by 
Chris Sims and Tao Zha argues that 
the only period since 1950 with a 
noticeably different monetary policy is 
the monetarist experiment of 1979-82, 
in which the Fed targeted monetary 
aggregates. Otherwise, monetary policy 
in the 1970s and post-1982 looks very 
similar. Sims and Zha do find that the 
period since 1982 is characterized by 
a decrease in the volatility of shocks 
hitting the economy. But their analysis 
suggests that if the volatility of shocks 
increases, the volatility of the overall 
economy could return to its pre-1980s 
level. 
A somewhat different story is 
told in a recent paper by Athanasios 
Orphanides.  He found that the Fed 
overstimulated the economy in the 
pre-1979 era, largely because it had 
difficulty in measuring how much 
real output was above or below the 
level it would be with everyone fully 
employed, that is, its potential level. If 
output is above its potential, monetary 
policymakers might decide to raise 
interest rates in order to slow down the 
economy. If output is below potential, 
policymakers may want to lower inter-
est rates to stimulate growth. However, 
monetary policy cannot keep output 
growing above its potential rate indefi-
nitely. Such a policy would eventually 
result in rising inflation. Orphanides 
FIGURE 3
Standard Deviation of TFP Growth
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6 See also Sylvain Leduc’s Business Review 
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suggests that the Fed believed the 
economy was performing much worse 
than its potential in the 1970s and so 
engaged in a stimulative policy that 
resulted in high inflation. The Fed 
mismeasured the gap between actual 
output and potential output because 
it had not yet realized that potential 
output growth had slowed from what it 
was in the 1960s.  
These studies found that 
monetary policy contributed to the 
high inflation of the pre-1979 era. 
Could such a policy have destabilized 
the economy and resulted in higher 
volatility of real output growth? If 
monetary policymakers do not raise 
short-term interest rates at least as 
much as the expected increase in infla-
tion, the result can be even higher in-
flation that must eventually be reined 
in by higher interest rates and, most 
likely, slower economic growth.   
To see this, consider the ef-
fect of interest rates on the economy. 
A lower real interest rate — that is, 
the difference between the nominal 
interest rate and the expected rate of 
inflation — can help stimulate the 
economy because it gives people less of 
an incentive to save today and more of 
an incentive to spend today.
Suppose the nominal inter-
est rate is 5 percent and expected 
inflation is 3 percent, so that the real 
interest rate is 2 percent. A dollar 
saved today will be worth $1.05 in one 
year. But since prices are expected to 
rise 3 percent, $1 saved today will buy 
only 1.02 units of goods and services 
in one year ($1.05/$1.03 = 1.02 units). 
If expected inflation rises to 4 percent 
and the nominal interest rate stays at 
5 percent, the real interest rate falls 
to 1 percent. Then $1 will buy only 
1.01 units of goods and services in one 
year ($1.05/$1.04 = 1.01 units). So a 
dollar saved today will buy less in the 
future. Hence, lower real interest rates 
suggest a smaller incentive to save and 
a greater incentive to spend. Note that 
if the nominal rate had increased the 
same amount as expected inflation, 
there would have been no change in 
the real rate and no change in the 
units that could be purchased.
Back to monetary policy. 
Suppose that expected inflation rises 
1 percent, and, in response, policy-
makers raise the federal funds rate 0.5 
percent.  As a consequence, the real 
federal funds rate — the federal funds 
rate less expected inflation — falls 0.5 
percent. This stimulates spending and 
tends to reinforce inflation.
Research by Clarida, Gali, 
and Gertler, and research that I car-
ried out with Leduc and Stark found 
precisely this type of policy behavior 
in the U.S. prior to 1979: Policymakers 
increased short-term nominal interest 
rates less than one-for-one with the 
rise in expected inflation.  If policy-
makers truly want to slow down the 
economy, the fed funds rate must in-
crease more than one-for-one with the 
rise in expected inflation, so that the 
real interest rate rises.  The higher real 
interest rate then helps slow current 
spending and economic growth.  After 
1979, short-term nominal interest rates 
rose more than one-for-one with a rise 
in expected inflation.
These findings suggest that 
monetary policy was destabilizing for 
the economy in the earlier period and 
stabilizing in the later period.  This 
change in monetary policy that oc-
curred around 1979 could be a signifi-
cant factor in explaining the drop in 
economic volatility in the 1980s. 
Several studies have at-
tempted to quantify how much the 
change in monetary policy contributed 
to the increased stability of the U.S. 
economy after the mid-1980s.  Stock 
and Watson used a model called a 
structural VAR to estimate how much 
monetary policy matters for increased 
economic stability.  Under various 
FIGURE 4
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assumptions about how certain features 
of the model match features of the U.S. 
economy, they find that from 20 per-
cent to 30 percent of the drop in the 
volatility of real output growth can be 
attributed to the change in monetary 
policy.  Carlino, DeFina, and I used a 
statistical model to measure how much 
monetary policy matters for the decline 
in U.S. employment volatility. We 
put an upper bound of 60 percent on 
monetary policy’s contribution to the 
variation in employment volatility.     
In recent work, Sylvain Leduc 
and I took a different approach by 
simulating a fully calibrated model 
of the U.S. economy under different 
assumptions about the behavior of 
monetary policy. Our model is a more 
explicit description of the economy 
than Stock and Watson’s VAR, but it 
does not capture the short-run dynam-
ics of the data as well.  The benefit of 
our approach is that the way in which 
people respond to changes in monetary 
policy can be fully worked out in the 
model, so policy’s contributions to the 
change in volatility can be more pre-
cisely quantified.  We found that the 
change in monetary policy accounts for 
only about 15 percent of the drop in 
the volatility of real output growth — a 
contribution smaller than that reported 
by Stock and Watson.  
HOW MUCH IS UNEXPLAINED?
The policy and nonpolicy 
factors discussed above are among the 
principal channels economists have 
looked at in trying to determine why 
the economy has become more stable 
since the mid-1980s. Measuring the 
contribution of these factors to the 
decline in volatility depends on the 
model used, but to use a rough mea-
sure, we might say that these factors 
account for much of the decline in the 
volatility of real output growth since 
the mid-1980s. Still, a significant part 
of the decline in volatility remains 
unexplained.  Stock and Watson refer 
to this remainder as “unexplained 
good luck.”  It means that the economy 
was not buffeted by large and variable 
shocks in the 1980s and 1990s as it 
had been before. 
What are these shocks?  
They are unexpected and unmeasured 
events that affect the economy, such as 
weather, domestic and foreign politi-
cal outcomes, and labor disputes. By 
their very nature, these shocks are 
difficult to identify and measure.  A 
consequence of this large, unexplained 
good luck component of the decline in 
volatility is that the increased stability 
experienced by the U.S. economy since 
the mid-1980s may be a temporary 
phenomenon.  If the bad luck of the 
pre-1980 period were to return, eco-
nomic volatility would, to some extent 
at least, increase.  
The finding that improved 
monetary policy contributed to the 
increased stability of the economy 
suggests, though, that even if the 
unexplained bad luck of the pre-1980 
period returns, the economy would not 
experience the same degree of volatil-
ity as before.  Monetary policymakers 
seem more attuned to the dangers of 
the boom-bust cycles that may occur if 
inflation is not kept low and stable.
CONCLUSION
The shift in monetary policy 
toward stabilizing inflation seems to be 
an important part of the story behind 
the decline in economic volatility. 
The data indicate that keeping infla-
tion low and stable seems to reduce 
economic volatility. Inflation-fight-
ing policies appear to help reduce 
boom-bust cycles for the economy and 
promote steadier economic growth. 
However, to the extent that 
a substantial fraction of the decline in 
economic volatility remains unac-
counted for, it remains uncertain 
whether lower volatility is a permanent 
feature of the U.S. economy.  It ap-
pears, though, that even should shocks 
that hit the economy become more 
variable, inflation-fighting monetary 
policy will help promote stability so 
that even if shocks similar to those 
of the pre-1980 period return, the 
economy would likely experience less 




much the change 
in monetary policy 
contributed to the 
increased stability 
of the U.S. economy 
after the mid-1980s.30   Q1  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q1  2004   31 www.phil.frb.org
REF  ER  ENC  ES
Blanchard, Olivier, and John Simon. “The 
Long and Large Decline in U.S. Output 
Volatility,” Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity 1:2001 (2001), pp. 135-64.
Carlino, Gerald, Robert DeFina, and Keith 
Sill. “Postwar Period Changes in Em-
ployment Volatility: New Evidence from 
State/Industry Panel Data,” Working Paper 
03-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia (2003).
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark 
Gertler. “Monetary Policy Rules and Mac-
roeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some 
Theory,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
115(1), 2000, pp. 147-80.
Hamilton, James D. “Oil and the Macro-
economy Since World War II,” Journal of 
Political Economy 91 (1983), pp. 228-48.
Kahn, James, Margaret McConnell, and 
Gabriel Perez-Quiros. “On the Causes 
of the Increased Stability of the U.S. 
Economy,” Economic Policy Review, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York (May 2002), 
pp. 183-202.
Khan, Aubhik. “The Role of Inventories in 
the Business Cycle,” Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia Business Review, Third 
Quarter 2003.
Khan, Aubhik, and Julia Thomas. 
“Inventories and the Business Cycle: An 
Equilibrium Analysis of (S,s) Policies,” 
manuscript, January 2003.
Kim, Chang-Jin, and Charles Nelson. 
“Has the U.S. Economy Become More 
Stable? A Bayesian Approach Based on a 
Markov-Switching Model of the Business 
Cycle,” Review of Economics and Statistics 
81 (1999), pp. 608-16.
Leduc, Sylvain. “How Inflation Hawks Es-
cape Expectations Traps,” Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia Business Review, First 
Quarter 2003.
Leduc, Sylvain, and Keith Sill. “Monetary 
Policy, Oil Shocks, and Macroeconomic 
Stability: Accounting for Postwar Volatil-
ity Decline,” manuscript, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia, 2003.
Leduc, Sylvain, Keith Sill, and Tom Stark. 
“Self-Fulfilling Expectations and the 
Inflation of the 1970s: Evidence from the 
Livingston Survey,” Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia Working Paper 02-13/R 
(2002).
McConnell, Margaret, and Gabriel Perez-
Quiros. “Output Fluctuations in the 
United States: What Has Changed Since 
the Early 1980s?” American Economic 
Review 90 (2000), pp. 1464-76.
Orphanides, Athanasios. “Monetary Policy 
Rules, Macroeconomic Stability, and Infla-
tion: A View from the Trenches,” manu-
script, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 2001.
Sims, Chris, and Tao Zha. “Macroeco-
nomic Switching,” manuscript, Princeton 
University, 2002.
Stock, James, and Mark Watson. “Has the 
Business Cycle Changed and Why?” NBER 
Working Paper 9127 (August 2002).
Taylor, John. “Remarks for the Panel Dis-
cussion on Recent Changes in Trend and 
Cycle,” manuscript, Stanford University, 
March 2000.
 